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AVENA & OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS: THE LITMUS FOR
LaGRAND & THE FUTURE OF CONSULAR RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Good foreign policy says you want your neighborhood to be peaceful and
prosperous. A good foreign policy starts with being friends with your
neighbors.., and we're very good friends with our neighbors to the
South, the Mexicanos.'
INTRODUCTION
Mexican national C6sar Roberto Fierro Reyna has been on death row in
Texas for the past two decades.2 Fierro may soon be executed3 despite the
discovery of compelling evidence found, in part, by the Mexican govern-
ment that he did not commit the murder for which he was sentenced.4 U.S.
officials never notified the Mexican government of his detention, and Mexi-
can officials only learned of the whereabouts of their citizen when they later
received a letter from Fierro's mother.' Because of the delay, Mexican con-
sular officials did not discover strong evidence that police coerced Fierro's
written confession until more than a decade after a jury used it to sentence
Fierro to death.6
1. Mexican President Vincente Fox, Remarks to University of Toledo Faculty, Students
and Community at University of Toledo's Savage Hall (Sep. 6, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-1 1.html.
2. See Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 676-79 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1621 (2003).
3. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128
(Feb. 5) [hereinafter Avena Order]; Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations (Mex. v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of
the United Mexican States (Jan. 9, 2003) 168, at 26 [hereinafter Application] (noting that
Fierro has exhausted his primary appeals and the State of Texas may schedule his execution at
any time). Fierro's latest petition for writ of certiorari was recently denied. See Fierro, 294
F.3d 674, cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1621 (2003). Mexico had filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of Fierro's petition. Id.
4. Death Penalty Information Center, Mexican Embassy Raises Questions of Innocence,
Fairness in Case of Cesar Roberto Fierro, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited
Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter DPIC]; A Texas Tragedy: the Shocking Case of C6sar Fierro, at
http://www.cesarfierro.com/summary.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter A Texas
Tragedy].
5. A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4; Application, supra note 3, 1 166, at 26.
6. See generally A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4; see infra notes 146 et seq. and accom-
panying text for further discussion regarding Fierro.
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The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations7 entities Fierro, as a
Mexican national, to be notified by police that he may contact his consulate
if arrested in a country that is a party to the Convention Due to the likely
differences in language, culture and legal systems, the treaty "embodies a
presumption of prejudice when a foreign national is arrested." The U.S.
joined the Vienna Convention over thirty years ago," and understands and
enjoys the protection the treaty provides to its citizens arrested abroad." In-
deed, the U.S. Department of State emphatically describes its mission to as-
sist U.S. citizens arrested abroad as "essential."' 2
In 1979 upon arrest in El Paso, Texas, C6sar Fierro was never informed
of his rights to contact the Mexican consulate. 3 Without notification, Fierro
could not avail himself of the important services only consulates can provide
to protect their nationals in criminal matters. 4 Consulates commonly have
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, done
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. 36 [hereinafter Convention].
8. Id. art. 36, 11 (b).
9. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 604 (1997).
10. Convention, supra note 7 (entered into force for the U.S. on Dec. 24, 1969).
11. See U.S. Department of State, Assistance to U.S. Citizens Arrested Abroad, available
at http://travel.state.gov/arrest.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Assistance to U.S.
Citizens] ("We stand ready to assist incarcerated citizens ... [we] monitor conditions in for-
eign prisons and immediately protest allegations of abuse against American prisoners. We
work with prison officials to ensure treatment consistent with internationally recognized stan-
dards of human rights and to ensure that Americans are afforded due process under local
laws.") This document references Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and its provision for
unimpeded access between U.S. consular officers and U.S. citizens when in treaty member
countries, as well as Bilateral Consular Conventions between the U.S. and some nations. Id.
Significantly, the State Department alludes to consular notification and access to exist based
on comity and diplomatic relations where no treaty is in force. See id.
12. Id. "Consular services include: Upon initial notification of arrest: - visiting the pris-
oner as soon as possible. .. - providing a list of local attorneys... - providing information
about judicial procedures in the foreign country; - notifying family and/or friends... - relay-
ing requests to family and friends for money or other aid..." Id. In addition, this document
provides a comprehensive list of "on-going" and "discretionary" support to incarcerated
Americans. Id.
13. DPIC, supra note 4; A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4; Application, supra note 3, at 26,
165.
14. Application, supra note 3, 165, at 26; see A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4 (noting
Mexican officials' belief that prompt notification of Fierro's detention would have led them to
intervene in the case and, based on their abilities in Mexico, uncover later-discovered evi-
dence of coercion by police that allegedly led to Fierro's confession and ultimately his con-
viction and sentence); Fierro, 294 F.3d at 676 (noting that the state habeas court found that
the detective had presented false testimony regarding the circumstances of Fierro's confes-
sion); see also Assistance to U.S. Citizens, supra note 11 (listing the various services provided
by the State Department to Americans incarcerated abroad); Application, supra note 3, E 20-
26, at 4-6. Mexico asserts its foreign service officers' provision of similar consular services
for its nationals by operation of its law, such as protecting "the dignity and fundamental rights
of Mexicans abroad in accordance with international law," consular duties "to notify the For-
eign Ministry of Mexico as to the plight of Mexicans abroad," protect the rights of nationals
abroad, visit detainees and provide representation. Id.
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2003], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol34/iss1/6
2003] THE FUTURE OF CONSULAR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 117
access to witnesses and evidence essential to a foreigner's defense at trial
and crucial to sentencing, whereas a local attorney, especially a public attor-
ney, may not have the time or resources to obtain this information. 5 In Fi-
erro's case, communication with his consulate and the evidence it could have
procured may have made the difference between freedom and twenty years
in jail.1" More significantly, evidence derived from consular services could
have prevented Fierro's death sentence and his eventual execution. 7
Fierro is just one of the fifty-four Mexicans currently on death row in
the United States, none of whom were provided with consular notification."
The failure of law enforcement to abide by the Vienna Convention's notifi-
cation requirements prevented these persons from exercising their right to
request that police notify their consulate of their detentions." Furthermore,
efforts by Mexico and the detained nationals to seek redress for violations of
the Convention have failed in U.S. political and judicial contexts." Conse-
quently, Mexico has put the matter before the International Court of Justice
("I.C.J.") 21 against the U.S. for its conceded "systemic violation' 2  of the
treaty in not informing detained Mexicans or their consulates of their right to
communicate. 3
Many countries and their nationals convicted in the U.S. share the frus-
trations felt by Mexico and its nationals on U.S. death row.4 Such countries
15. See A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4; see also Margaret Mendenhall, A Case for Con-
sular Notification: Treaty Obligation as a Matter of Life or Death, 8 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
335, 346-48 (noting that consular officers can generally (1) provide comfort and communica-
tion through visits and humanitarian aid to detained persons; (2) provide for an adequate de-
fense by helping to "obtain and certify documents [and evidence] from the home country;"
and (3) procure effective defense counsel where a public attorney may be inexperienced,
which is especially important in capital cases.) Mendenhall also describes the case study of a
Mr. Wamba, Argentine consul general to the U.S., who intervened in the capital trial of Victor
Hugo Saldano to replace Saldano's counsel because he did not object to an expert's testimony
that cited race as a factor to be considered by the jury when determining the defendant's pres-
entation of future danger to society. Id. at 354-55. Mendenhall argues Wamba's efforts di-
rectly resulted in saving Saldano from being executed and indirectly led to a Texas statutory
change eliminating race as a legitimate factor in sentencing. Id.
16. See A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4.
17. Id.
18. See Application, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. Application, supra note 3, 28-64, at 6-13, U 67-267, at 13-40 (briefly reporting on
the U.S. procedural history of each of the fifty-four Avena Mexican subjects on death row).
21. The I.C.J. serves as the main judicial arm of the United Nations to settle disputes fal-
ling under its limited jurisdiction between nations. Pieter H.F. Bekker, ASIL Insights: World
Court Consular Notification and Death Penalty Challenge Revisited: Mexico v. United States,
The American Society of International Law, available at http://www.asil.org/in-
sights/insigh95.htm (Jan. 2003).
22. Id.
23. Application, supra note 3, 1, at 1, 280, at 43-44.
24. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Breard Order]; see also Case Concerning the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter LaGrand
3
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and their citizens have sought and failed to realize redress in U.S. courts for
violations of the Vienna Convention, and their quest for international adjudi-
cation is not new." However, prior I.C.J. cases have not resulted in relief for
the foreign nationals held in the U.S.26 Indeed, in the face of an explicit I.C.J.
"Provisional Measures Orders" ("PMO")" to stay executions because of al-
leged (and often conceded) Vienna violations, the executions have pro-
ceeded.2" In the case of Karl and Walter LaGrand, two German brothers con-
victed of murder in Arizona, Arizona executed Walter in defiance of an
I.C.J. order of stay. 9 Afterward, Germany maintained its action, seeking a
final judgment from the I.C.J. regarding its citizens' Vienna Convention
rights in the U.S? LaGrand resulted in an unprecedented decision against
the U.S. that provided not only some answers as to the status of rights and
remedies under the Vienna Convention, but many other unanswered ques-
tions as well.3
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services32 reports arrests of well over
one million Mexicans by U.S. authorities in a recent year, representing over
ninety-five percent of foreign nationals arrested in the U.S.33 Virtually none
Order]; La Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Summary of the Judgment (June 27, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter LaGrand Judgment].
25. See Breard Order, LaGrand Order and LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24.
26. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998); F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111-112
(1999). The federal government and judiciary declined to be bound by the Breard and La-
grand Orders which directed the U.S. to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that" the
foreign subjects in question were not executed prior to a final I.C.J. judgment in matter.
Breard Order, supra note 24, 41; LaGrand Order, supra note 24, 29; see also discussion
infra Part II.
27. Provisional measures orders are the I.C.J.'s functional equivalent of a preliminary
injunction to bar the act of a party in order to prevent harm to another party's rights prior to a
final ruling in a case.
28. See Bekker, supra note 21.
29. Amnesty International, United States of America: A Time for Action-Protecting the
Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty, Al Index: AMR
51/106/2001 (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter AI Report]. Arizona executed the other LaGrand
brother, Karl Lagrand, prior to the I.C.J. order. Id.
30. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24.
31. See discussion infra Parts II and IV.
32. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) replaced the functions of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as of March 1, 2003. U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, THIS Is USCIS, at http://www.uscis.gov/graphicslaboutus/ thi-
sisimmlindex.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
33. INS STATISTICS Div., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IMMIGRATION
FACT SHEET 1996 (Oct. 1997), at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/abou-
tus/statistics/110.htm and http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/299.htm (report-
ing 1,598,016 Mexicans apprehended among an all-countries total of 1,649,986 persons,
which is -96.9 percent); see also U.S. CTZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/
2000ExecSumm.pdf (Jan. 31, 2003) ("Mexico is the largest source country for unauthorized
immigration to the United States. The estimated unauthorized resident population from
Mexico [was about]... 4.8 million in January 2000. .. . The new estimates are based
4
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of these often uneducated and non-English speaking persons' receive notice
of their consular rights, and certainly not "without delay"3 as required by the
Vienna Convention.3 The U.S. judicial and political responses to an I.C.J.
order of stay for executions37 and any future judgment in Mexico's Avena
case will ultimately reveal the effectiveness of the LaGrand decision in pro-
viding relief for foreign nationals, the overwhelming majority of which are
Mexicans who were (and will be) unduly deprived of consular notification
and access rights by U.S. officials.38
Part I of this comment reviews the applicable law of consular access by
detained foreign nationals as provided by the Vienna Convention. Part II de-
tails the two prior I.C.J. cases concerning U.S. violations of the Vienna Con-
vention that provide the legal backdrop for the analysis of Avena. Part III
provides the factual background of U.S. violations and the arguments of both
state parties in Avena, and compares Mexico's own compliance with the Vi-
enna Convention to U.S. practice. Part IV questions the implications of the
current PMOs and any future Avena-like judgments against the U.S. in light
of precedent. The comment concludes with recommendations for legal and
non-legal action to resolve the problem of consular notification unique to
Mexicans arrested in the United States.
ary 2000 .... The new estimates are based primarily on the foreign-born population counted
in the 2000 Census and annual INS statistics (immigrants admitted, deportable aliens re-
moved, and nonimmigrant residents admitted)"). These statistics provide evidence of the
magnitude of the Mexican population in the U.S. that therefore become a majority of the for-
eign nationals arrested here. Id.
34. See Patrick Timmons, La Abogada de Mexico: Sandra Babcock's Battle Against the
Death Penalty, THE TEx. OBSERVER, October 25, 2002, available at http://www.texasob-
server.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
[The] profile of the Mexican national who finds himself in jail charged with a
capital offense is somebody who has certainly not graduated from high school, has
as little as a first-grade education, and who often has some form of neurological
impairments due to exposure to pesticides and head injuries. There is an extraordi-
narily high incidence of head injuries amongst Mexican nationals who grew up in
parts of rural Mexico. Often Mexican nationals accused of capital crimes don't
speak English and are inherently more vulnerable than a U.S. national for all these
reasons I've mentioned. They don't understand the legal system, they don't trust
their lawyers because most of their lawyers don't speak Spanish. So they really
need the help of the consulate to overcome all of those barriers.
Id. Babcock directs the Mexican government-funded Mexican Legal Capital Assistance Pro-
gram which has provided legal aid to Mexican nationals charged with capital crimes or on
death row in the U.S. since September 2000. Id.; see also Application, supra note 3,191 25-27,
at 5-6.
35. Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(l)(b).
36. See Al Report, supra note 29, at 4; see also Application, supra note 3, 91 268-279, at
40-43 (describing the "pattern and practice of violations" by the U.S.).
37. Avena Order, supra note 3 (Mexico has already requested and received a provisional
measures order from the I.C.J.).
38. Timmons, supra note 34 (140 Mexican nationals await capital trials in the U.S. in
addition to the 54 named in Avena who are currently on death row.).
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I. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS RIGHTS
UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
A. History
The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations generally governs
consular issues de jure between the United States, Mexico and the majority
of the world's nations.39 States have traditionally appreciated a foreign con-
sulate's function to communicate with and provide protection to its nation-
als.' Prior to and since the entry into force of the Vienna Convention, the
U.S. entered bilateral and multilateral treaties concerning consular relations
with many countries.' In 1942, Mexico and the U.S. promulgated the Mex-
ico-United States Consular Convention. '2 Many of these pre-Vienna treaties
with the U.S. provided for notice to the appropriate consulate of its na-
tional's detention; mandatory forwarding of any communication between the
consul and the detainee; and permission for the consul to visit, privately
communicate and arrange for legal representation for the detainee."3
Since the Vienna Convention, Mexico and the U.S. have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican and
United States Nationals." The Memorandum mirrors the Vienna Convention
by providing for notification of detained foreign nationals of their right to
consular access, the right to contact consular officers, and the facilitation of
communication between consuls and their nationals. '5 Similar to the Conven-
tion, the Memorandum provides for meeting places that permit confidential
interviews between consuls and nationals, and allows consular officers to be
39. Convention, supra note 7. Since entry into force on March 19, 1967, 165 countries
have become signatories. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER
OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF
CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO ASSIST THEM, at Part 5 n.1, at http://travel.state.gov/con-
sul_notify.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) [hereinafter CONSULAR NOTIFICATION).
40. Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and
Access under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 32 (2000).
41. See, e.g., Convention Relating to Consular Officers, June 6, 1951, U.S.-U.K.-Ir., 122
U.N.T.S. 1953, 2174 (mutually covering consular relations between the U.S. and Britain and
its dependencies and many of the former British colony States); Consular Convention, June 1,
1964, 19 U.S.T. 5018 (mutually covering consular relations between the U.S. and the former
Soviet republics); CONSULAR NOTIFICATION, supra note 39 (providing a comprehensive list of
bilateral and multilateral consular relations treaties to which the U.S. is a party, and including
a table of those states party to the Vienna Convention).
42. Consular Convention Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, Aug. 12, 1942, U.S.-Mex., art. 6, 57 Stat. 800.
43. Schiffman, supra note 40, at 32.
44. Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican and United
States Nationals (May 7, 1996), available at http://www.migracionintemacional.com
docum/memoraji.htmIl (last visited Sep. 29, 2003).
45. Id.
6
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present at judicial proceedings." While not legally binding, the Memoran-
dum encourages good faith compliance with consular access rights by Mex-
ico and the U.S. as to the foreign country's nationals."
B. Purpose
The Vienna Convention typifies the purpose of consular relations
agreements. The nations that adopted the Convention "believ[ed] that an in-
ternational convention on consular relations, privileges and immunities
would... contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations,
irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems .... .""
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention defines many consular functions, in-
cluding "helping and assisting nationals"49 of the foreign state. Because
States recognize that "[olne of the most important responsibilities of the
consul is to protect the nationals of the sending state,"5 the Convention pro-
vides for unimpeded communication between the detained foreign national
and his consul." Indeed, the U.S. itself emphasized the essential function and
importance of open communication between consuls and detained nationals
when it asserted their rights in United States v. Iran, its own prior case at the
I.C.J._1
C. Article 36
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, entitled "Communication and
Contact With Nationals of the Sending State," provides for reciprocal com-
munication and access between foreign consular officers and their nationals
in the receiving state." Paragraph l(b) imposes duties on receiving state offi-
cials. It provides that receiving state officials shall inform the relevant con-
46. Id.
47. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION, supra note 39.
48. Application, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the preamble to the Convention, supra
note 7).
49. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 264 (1998).
50. Id. at 264 (The Vienna Convention uses the term "sending State" to refer to the na-
tion from which the foreign national is a citizen while present in the "receiving State").
51. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 36.
52. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
Pleadings at 174 ("[T]he consular officer is to provide varying kinds of assistance to nationals
of the sending State, and for this reason the channel of communication... is so essential to
the exercise of consular functions that its preclusion would render meaningless the entire es-
tablishment of consular relations ... ").
53. Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(1) ("consular officers shall be free to communicate
with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular offi-
cers of the sending State ... ").
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sulate upon the request of the detained foreign national "without delay." 4
Paragraph l(b) also directs receiving state officials to forward "any commu-
nication addressed to the consular post" by the detained person, again "with-
out delay."5 Finally, receiving state officials must inform the detainee,
"without delay," of his or her rights to communicate with and have access to
the consulate.56
Article 36, paragraph l(c) discusses the rights of consular officers. It
empowers consular officers to visit, converse and correspond with a detained
national and to aid in procuring legal counsel." Consular officers retain these
visitation and communication rights with the detained national both before
and after any conviction.58
Finally, paragraph 2 mandates that consular rights provided in Article
36(1) be exercised in accordance with the domestic laws of the receiving
state.59 The domestic law of the receiving state, however, "must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Arti-
cle 36] are intended."'
54. Id. art. 36(1)(b). The text of the article states:
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district,
a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the con-
sular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be for-
warded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph....
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 36(l)(c). The text of the article states:
[C]onsular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who
is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to ar-
range for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any na-
tional of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking
action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly
opposes such action.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 36(2). The text of the article states:
The rights referred to in paragraph I of this Article shall be exercised in confor-
mity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to
the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Id.
60. Id.
8
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D. The Jurisdiction & Provisional Measures Order Power of the L C.J.
Mexico brings its current action against the U.S. at the I.C.J. under the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes."' The
Optional Protocol supplemented the Vienna Convention to give compulsory
jurisdiction to the I.C.J. over state "disputes arising out of the interpretation
or application of the Convention."6
The power of the I.C.J. to issue PMOs stems from Article 41 of the
I.C.J. statute. Article 41 provides that the Court "shall have the power to in-
dicate.., any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party. ' I.C.J. PMOs serve to maintain the status
quo so as to protect state parties' rights that might otherwise by irreparably
harmed."
The U.S.'s execution of foreign nationals despite I.C.J. orders to the
contrary creates a major source of contention between the United States and
foreign states.' In addition, the treaty's silence as to a remedy for violations
creates much of the contemporary controversy surrounding foreign capital
defendants.' Part IV, infra, considers such issues in light of the I.C.J. cases,
discussed below, which addressed the U.S.'s Vienna Convention violations.
II. PRECEDENT FOR A VENA
The Republic of Paraguay and the Federal Republic of Germany
brought the U.S before the I.C.J. for violations of the Vienna Convention in
the Breard and LaGrand cases, respectively.67 These two important cases
provide the legal context for Avena and its implications in the U.S.
61. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, done
Apr. 24, 1963, Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. I [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. Note that the Optional
Protocol's provision for compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. for Vienna dispute subjects the
U.S. to I.C.J. jurisdiction in Avena despite the U.S.'s withdrawal of its submission to the stat-
ute of the I.C.J.
62. Optional Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 1.
63. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, chapt. III, art. 41, 1, 59
Stat. 1005, 1062; see also Optional Protocol, supra note 61.
64. Bekker, supra note 21.
65. Mexico's President Snubs Bush, CBSNEWS.com, Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.
cbsnews.comlstories/2002/08/15/deathpenalty/main518772.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003);
Breard Order, supra note 24; LaGrand Order supra note 24; LaGrand Judgment, supra note
24; Application, supra note 3.
66. The Vienna Convention provides consular communications rights but no remedy in
the even the rights are violated. Mexico seeks a meaningful remedy at law that where the U.S.
violates the Convention; the U.S. relies mainly on the doctrine of procedural default to bar
Vienna claims not brought at trial. See Application, supra note 3, 281, at 44.
67. Breard Order, supra note 24; LaGrand Order, supra note 24; LaGrand Judgment, su-
pra note 24.
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A. Angel Breard
In 1993, a Virginia jury convicted Paraguayan national Angel Francisco
Breard of attempted rape and murder.6 Less than two weeks before his exe-
cution, scheduled on April 14, 1998, Paraguay sought relief before the I.C.J.,
claiming the U.S. violated the Vienna Convention by not advising Breard of
his consular access rights upon arrest or at any time thereafter.' Paraguay
learned of Breard's conviction and detention in 1996 on its own accord, and
without notification from U.S. authorities." Upon discovering Breard's
whereabouts, Paraguay instituted proceedings before U.S. federal courts
seeking to commute Breard's death sentence based on the Vienna claim."
Breard filed federal habeas corpus petitions on his own behalf, which
were comprised of claims under the Vienna Convention.72 The District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled the claim was procedurally barred
for not having been brought at trial, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed." Additionally, these same courts denied Paraguay's actions for re-
lief.7" Both Breard and Paraguay then petitioned for writs of certiorari before
the Supreme Court, which was ultimately granted."
Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Paraguay asked the I.C.J. to direct
the U.S., via a PMO, to stay Breard's execution pending a final decision by
the I.C.J.' The I.C.J. found Paraguay had established a prima facie case that
urgently required it to direct the U.S. to prevent the pending execution.77 In
its April 9, 1998 Order, the I.C.J. unanimously ruled" that the U.S. "should
68. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
69. Breard Order, supra note 24, 1 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. 13.
72. Breard Order, supra note 24, 3; Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
73. Breard Order, supra note 24, 3; Breard, 523 U.S. at 373 (citing Breard v. Nether-
land, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 620 (1998)).
74. Breard, 523 U.S. at 374 (citing Republic of Paraguay, v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269,
1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)).
75. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373-74.
76. Breard Order, supra note 24, 9. Under normal circumstances, a state must fully ex-
haust all available domestic remedies before seeking relief from the I.C.J. In light of the
scheduled execution, however, the I.C.J. accepted Paraguay's application and request for the
indication of Provisional Measures.
77. Id. 23, 39.
78. Id. 41 (Declarations of three I.C.J. judges qualified the "unanimous" provisional
measures order.); see id. at Declaration of President Schwebel (noting the U.S.'s apology to
Paraguay and its efforts to avoid Vienna violations in the future, but that he voted for the Or-
der recognizing the "incontestable urgency" of the matter, though with "disquiet" due to the
limited briefing in the matter), Judge Abdul G. Koroma (voting for the Order but declaring
himself "[tiorn" as to the propriety of the grant in light of respect due to the sovereignty of the
U.S. criminal justice system's conviction of Breard), and Judge Shigeru Oda (voting in favor
of the Order for "humanitarian reasons," but arguing that the uncontested U.S. violation of the
Vienna Convention removed any dispute; that "[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction to de-
cide matters relating to capital punishment and its execution, and should not intervene in such
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take all measures at its disposal" to stall Breard's execution pending the
I.C.J.'s final judgment in the matter.79
Five days later, on the day of the execution, the Supreme Court jointly
denied both Breard's and Paraguay's petitions. ° The Court first indicated
that Breard procedurally defaulted his Article 36 claim for not having raised
the issue at trial. Despite the call of the Vienna Convention that domestic
law "must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded" under Article 36,' the Court held that international law clearly
mandated that "the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implemen-
tation of the treaty in that State."83
Breard's claim also failed under the "last-in-time" doctrine, whereby a
statute enacted subsequent in time to a treaty, renders inconsistent treaty
provisions null." Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") in 1996 that supported the doctrine of procedural
default for habeas petitions. Under AEDPA, a petitioner alleging a treaty
violation will not be provided an evidentiary hearing when the claimant
failed to raise the allegation in state court.8 Thus, because assertion of Vi-
enna violations was subject to this "last-in-time" rule, the court barred
Breard's Article 36 claim.86
Regarding prejudice, the court found Breard's claim, that had he been
permitted consular access he would have accepted the State's offer to forgo
the death penalty in return for a plea of guilty "speculative."87 Additionally,
the court denied Paraguay's claims based on a lack of a private right of ac-
tion for a foreign state asserting Vienna Convention violations.88 It found that
the sovereign immunity clause within the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution barred Paraguay's suit;89 that no consequences continued for the
matters[;]" that the U.S. apology and promise to Paraguay to prevent future violations re-
leased the U.S. from responsibility; that consular contact for Breard would not have changed
the judicial procedure against him; and that provisional measures are granted to prevent the
imminent breach of rights, a risk not currently faced by Breard or Paraguay, making the cur-
rent grant improper).
79. Id. 41.
80. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
81. ld. at 375.
82. Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(2).
83. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
84. Id. at 376 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion)); see also
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988) (holding that where a federal statute and a
treaty conflict, "the one last in date will control the other").
85. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. 1998)).
86. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376-77.
87. Id. at 377.
88. Id.
89. Id. (reciting the Eleventh "Amendment's 'fundamental principle' that the States, in
the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them... by a foreign
State .. " (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934))).
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failure to notify the Paraguayan consulate;' and that neither Paraguay nor its
Consul General had standing to raise due process civil rights claims.9 The
Court also deferred to the Executive branch's role to conduct diplomatic dis-
cussion with Paraguay.' Finally, it stated that the Governor of Virginia re-
tained the discretion to await a final I.C.J. decision, but that "nothing in our
existing case law allows us to make that choice for him."3 On April 14,
1998, in the hours following the Supreme Court's Breard decision, Virginia
Governor James S. Gilmore did not act to stop the execution. The State of
Virginia lethally injected Breard that same night.95
The previous evening, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had asked
Governor Gilmore to stay Breard's execution pending an I.C.J. decision.'
Albright's request contrasted with the U.S. Solicitor General's position in its
amicus brief filed in Paraguay v. Gilmore' that urged the Supreme Court to
deny relief to Paraguay. Interestingly, neither Albright nor the Solicitor
deemed the I.C.J.'s order binding." Paraguay withdrew its I.C.J. action later
in 1998, preventing the I.C.J from reaching a final judgment on the issue of
consular rights."
In Breard, "the first case where an international tribunal... intervened
in ongoing domestic proceedings and issued a ruling to postpone the execu-
tion of a criminal sentence,"'" the Supreme Court found it "unfortunate that
this matter comes before [the court] while proceedings are pending before
the I.C.J that might have been brought to that court earlier."'' 1 Seemingly in
response to the Supreme Court's concern for punctuality, Mexico brought
90. Breard, 523 U.S. at 377-78.
91. Id. at 378. Individuals rather than foreign nations have standing for civil rights claims
such as depravation of due process of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
92. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
93. Id. Cf. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679, 680 (1998) (deeming the I.C.J.'s Breard Order binding and that even
if it wasn't, the federal government's foreign affairs power could compel the Supreme Court
and Virginia to comply); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 683 (1998) (ques-
tioning the Clinton administration's claim that the choice to comply lay solely with the Gov-
emor of Virginia).
94. Tenagne Tadesse, The BreardAftermath: Is the U.S. Listening?, 8 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 423,424 (2001).
95. Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States
Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 227, 248 (2000).
96. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
97. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Paraguay v. Gilmore (No. 97-
1390).
98. Cf. Henkin, supra note 93, at 680.
99. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov. 10).
100. William J. Aceves, Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States) Provisional Measures Order, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 517, 522
(1998).
101. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
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Avena in advance of any definitively-scheduled executions of its nationals
on death row, the majority of whom remain in state court on first instance
appellate proceedings and likely will not face execution for several years."°
B. Karl & Walter LaGrand
In 1984, Arizona convicted brothers Karl and Walter LaGrand for the
murder of an employee during an unsuccessful bank robbery. °3 Law en-
forcement did not notify, upon arrest or anytime thereafter, either of the La-
Grands, both German nationals, of their right to consular access.' However,
in 1992, ten years after their arrest, the brothers contacted the German
consulate at the advice of a third party. 5 Not until 1998 were the brothers
formally notified of their right to speak with the German consulate.' °6 By that
date, the LaGrands had exhausted their appellate options in state court. 7
Germany then assisted the brothers in filing Vienna Convention claims,
which failed for procedural default in the U.S. district and circuit courts."'
Since 1992, Germany had accepted that Arizona did not know of the
LaGrands' German nationality, despite Arizona having information indicat-
ing they were likely not U.S. citizens."° On February 23, 1999, the day be-
fore Karl's scheduled execution, an Arizona State attorney admitted that
Arizona had known that the brothers were German since the arrest in 1982.110
Upon this revelation, and with the brothers' executions pending, Germany
hastened to file an application before the I.C.J. based on Article 36 viola-
tions."'
Arizona executed Karl as scheduled on February 24, 1999."' Germany
filed its I.C.J. action roughly a week later on March 2, 1999, the day before
Walter's scheduled execution." 3 Germany sought a-PMO to enjoin the U.S.
102. Application, supra note 3, 69-267, at 13-40 (providing the procedural status in
U.S. Courts of the 54 Avena subjects).
103. Trainer, supra note 95, at 248.
104. Id. (recognizing that the U.S. conceded the violation of Article 36 as to the La-
Grands); LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, [ 37-42.
105. Jennifer Lynne Weinman, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal Procedure and the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the International Court of Justice
Decision in the LaGrand Case, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 857, 867 (2002).
106. Id. at 867 n.52.
107. Id. at 868-69.
108. Id. at 870.
109. LaGrand Order, supra note 24, 1 3.
110. Id.
111. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104, 5 (Mar. 2) [hereinafter LaGrand
Application]. Germany filed its application with the I.C.J. within one week after learning of
Arizona's knowledge that the LaGrands were German.
112. Id. 8.
113. Id. Prior to Arizona's admission that authorities were aware that the LaGrands were
German nationals, Germany presumably waited to file their I.C.J. action as they determined
13
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from executing Walter; for declaratory and compensatory relief; and
satisfaction for Karl's prior execution."4 The I.C.J. unanimously'" granted
Germany's request for a PMO on March 3, 1999 and directed the U.S. to
"take all measures at its disposal" to prevent Walter's death."6 In light of the
pending execution, the I.C.J. granted the request without hearing arguments
from the U.S."7
Two hours before the execution,"' Germany asserted the I.C.J. order by
filing motions at the Supreme Court to enjoin the U.S. and Arizona from
executing Walter. "' The Supreme Court flatly rejected Germany's mo-
tions. " The Court disclaimed its original jurisdiction for cases affecting con-
suls because Walter did not fall into that category.'' It also rejected the mo-
tion against the U.S. based on sovereign immunity principles.' The Court
also held that, as in Breard, Arizona was immune from Germany's action
based on the Eleventh Amendment, and the Vienna Convention did not sup-
port a foreign state's ability to assert a claim against an individual U.S.
state.' Finally, the Court remarked on the "tardiness" of Germany's pleas in
that the "action was filed within only two hours of a scheduled execu-
tion . ,,124
A few hours later, Arizona put Walter to death.25 However, rather than
dismiss the I.C.J. action, Germany maintained the action in order to obtain a
final judgment. Germany asked the I.C.J. to find that the U.S. violated Arti-
cle 36, and that the U.S. procedural default bar to Vienna claims was in
breach of its treaty obligations. 26 Germany further asserted that the U.S. vio-
they did not have a claim against the U.S. for violations under the Vienna Convention, though
the treaty does not discuss issues such as knowledge on the part of the receiving state.
114. Id.9J 15.
115. LaGrand Order, supra note 24, 29 (The Court voted unanimously in favor of the
Order but not unequivocally); Id. at Separate Opinion of President Schwebel (voting in favor
of the Order based on its substance, but with "profound reservations" regarding the procedure
of both Germany's late filing yet arguing that exigency mandated issuance without hearing a
U.S. rebuttal, and the Court's grant of the Order ex parte as potentially in violation of the
Rules of the Court); Id. at Declaration of Judge Shigeru Oda (also voting in favor of the Order
but "solely for humanitarian reasons" and "with great hesitation" because he felt that Ger-
many's request did not accord with the "fundamental nature of provisional measures.").
116. Id. [29.
117. International Court of Justice, Press Release, The Court Calls on the United States
to Prevent the Execution of Walter LeGrand pending a Final Decision (Mar. 3, 1999), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iPressl999/ipresscom9909-igus-19990303.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
118. Federal Republic of Germany v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
119. Id. at 111.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 112.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 112; Breard, 523 U.S. at 377
124. F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 112.
125. Trainer, supra note 95, at 249; see also F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 112.
126. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, 1 2.
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lated the Order by executing Walter, that the U.S. must assure future com-
pliance with the treaty, and provide a method of review and reconsideration
for criminal cases comprising Vienna violations.12'
On June 27, 2001, the I.C.J issued its judgment establishing its jurisdic-
tion and the admissibility as to all of Germany's submissions. 2 ' The Court
also found that the U.S. violated Article 36, paragraph l(b), for not inform-
ing the LaGrands of their consular rights. 29 The Court found the initial
breach of paragraph l(b) further violated paragraphs l(a) and (c) of Article
36, in that Germany's right to communicate, assist and visit the LaGrands
under l(a) and (c) was compromised between 1982 to 1992 due to the notifi-
cation failure." Significantly, the Court established that the LaGrands per-
sonally held rights under paragraph 1; thus, the U.S. breached its obligations
to both Germany and to the brothers themselves.'' Further, the I.C.J. deter-
mined that the doctrine of procedural default did not per se violate Article
36, but that as applied in this case, it prevented Germany from assisting the
LaGrands."' Thus, procedural default in this instance violated the mandate
that the receiving State give full effect to the treaty through its domestic law
"by not permitting the review and reconsideration ... of the convictions and
sentences of the LaGrand brothers.' 33
Reviewing U.S. efforts to comply with the Order to prevent Walter's
execution, the I.C.J. considered the legal effect of its PMOs.'34 The I.C.J.
deemed the object and purpose of its provisional measures article was to en-
able it to fulfill its basic function to settle international disputes via the
power of binding decisions. 35 The I.C.J. explicitly held for the first time that
the power to indicate provisional measures must be binding. 36 Further sup-
port derived from the general rule, that parties must abstain from prejudicing
the rights of other parties in dispute, can only be effectuated through binding
injunctions to preserve the status quo. 137
Finding binding power in its March 3, 1999 Order, the I.C.J. examined
U.S. compliance with its call to take all measures to prevent Walter's execu-
tion.3 8 The U.S. transmitted the Order to the Governor of Arizona, as di-
127. Id. 14.
128. Id. 1 128(1)-(2).
129. Id. 128(3).
130. Id. 65-78.
131. Id.
132. Id. (H 79-91.
133. Id. 128(4).
134. Id. (H 92-116.
135. Id.
136. Id. 92-116, 128(5).
137. Id. 92-116 (citing Electric Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 79, at 199 (Dec. 5). The Court also looked to Article 94, 1 of the U.N. charter re-
quiring that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of
the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." id. (citation omitted).
138. Id.
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rected by the Order, though without commentary 39 The U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral's letter to the Supreme Court described orders of the I.C.J. as non-
binding.' Noting that the Governor of Arizona permitted Walter's execution
despite receiving a recommendation of stay from the Arizona Board of
Clemency, " the I.C.J. found the sum of these actions insufficient, putting
the U.S. in breach of the Order.42 The I.C.J. next examined the U.S.'s na-
tionwide efforts to notify its federal, state and local authorities of consular
notification duties as to foreign detainees.4 3 It held that these efforts satisfied
Germany's request for an assurance against future violations.'"
Germany also requested that the U.S. be directed to "ensure in law and
practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36" upon any future
arrests of German nationals.' The I.C.J. noted this request, asked the court
to rule on the substance of U.S. law, and reiterated its finding that procedural
default did not per se violate Article 36." However, the I.C.J. held that
should German nationals"'7 be detained, convicted and sentenced to "severe
penalties"'4" in the U.S., in violation of the Vienna Convention, "an apology
would not suffice," and "it would be incumbent upon the United States to al-
low the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention."'" 9 This im-
plicitly means that U.S. procedural default cannot bar a Vienna Convention
claim. However, the I.C.J. clearly stated the obligation to provide "review
and reconsideration"'50 "can be carried out in various ways," and that "[t]he
choice of means must be left to the United States."' 5'
139. Id.
140. F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, 92-116.
142. Id. 92-116, 128(5).
143. Id. 9f 117-127, 128(6).
144. Id.
145. Id. 4.
146. Id. 79-91.
147. As to whether the LaGrand Judgment applies exclusively to German nationals, see
LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, at Declaration of President Guillaume; see also Al Report,
supra note 29, at 3 (arguing that the declaration by Guillaume clarifies that the principles in
the judgment apply to all nationalities); Weinman, supra note 105, at 898-900 (arguing that
the LaGrand judgment can successfully be incorporated into the U.S. criminal justice system,
that it "should apply equally to all member countries," and advising that the U.S. should not
narrowly read the decision as applying only to German nationals because any remedial pur-
pose of the decision will fail and prejudice will befall those nations that cannot bring forth an
I.C.J. action to protect their nationals due to economic and political constraints).
148. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, 9M 117-127, 128(7). Note that "severe penalties"
remains undefined in the judgment, but arguably conceives of all capital cases. See id. at
Separate Opinion of Vice-president Shi (referring to paragraph 128(7), Shi observes that "a
sentence of death.., is a punishment of a severe and irreversible nature.").
149. Id. 9M 117-127.
150. Id.
151. Id.( 117-127, 128(7).
16
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LaGrand established answers to some of the questions raised by the
Breard affair. The I.C.J.'s holdings that the Vienna Convention embodies
individual rights are significant: the U.S. must provide "review and recon-
sideration" for convictions and sentences concluded in violation of Vienna;
and I.C.J. PMOs are binding. Critical questions remain, however, such as
whether the judgment applies solely to Germans or to all foreign nationals
arrested in the U.S. and what the practical effect of the I.C.J.'s holding that
Article 36 creates individual, enforceable rights will be. A judgment in
Avena may resolve some of these important unknowns.
III. AVENA & THE QUALITY OF CONSULAR ACCESS FOR MEXICANS
ARRESTED IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Facts of Avena: U.S. Practice of the Vienna Convention as to
Mexicans
Mexico brought its action on behalf of itself and fifty-four of its nation-
als currently on the U.S. "death row," none of whom were notified of their
consular rights "without delay" as mandated by Article 36.152 At best, Mex-
ico notes four cases where "some attempt" was made, though not "without
delay."'53 For example, two individuals were notified of consular rights at
their arraignments." Mexico claims that in at least thirty-six of the cases au-
thorities knew or had at least some evidence those arrested were likely not
U.S. citizens.'55 These defendants either possessed I.N.S. identification cards
or were registered with the I.N.S. as permanent residents, yet law enforce-
ment still failed to notify Mexican officials.'56
152. Application, supra note 3, 272, at 41. The 54 Mexicans in question are on death
row in the following states: Arizona (1), Arkansas (1), California (28), Florida (1), Illinois (3),
Nevada (1), Ohio (1), Oklahoma (1), Oregon (1), and Texas (16). Id. 1 1, at 1, 91 67-267, at
13-40; see also Avena Order, supra note 3, 2, at 2.
153. Application, supra note 3, 68, at 13.
154. Id. 194, at 17, 1 102, at 18 (Marcos Esquivel-Barrera was informed by the prosecu-
tion during arraignment close to a week after arrest that he had the right to "contact and assis-
tance of the Mexican Consul General" and Arturo Juarez Suarez received notice at arraign-
ment two days after arrest and after he had provided incriminating statements to the police).
Mexico also cites Eduardo David Vargas who was informed of his consular rights by immi-
gration officials but never by police officials upon his detention for suspicion of murder, de-
spite knowledge of his Mexican nationality. Id. 150, at 24.
155. See generally id. at 14-31, 33-34, 36-38 (demonstrating that 36 of 54 defendants
possessed identification cards or were registered with the I.N.S. as permanent residents).
Mexico makes various claims as to these 54 nationals: (1) the individual told police during
initial detention that he was Mexican, born in Mexico or went to school in Mexico; (2) au-
thorities were "aware" the arrestee was Mexican; (3) police records indicated that the individ-
ual was Mexican; (4) the individual was arrested with an I.N.S. card or was registered with
the I.N.S. as a permanent resident; or (5) the prosecutor referred to the defendant's Mexican
nationality at trial or had immigration records. Id.
156. Id.
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Mexico concurrently filed a request for a PMO with its application, ask-
ing that the I.C.J. order the U.S. to make efforts to prevent the pending
(though unscheduled) executions of three of the inmates who "risk execution
within the next six months."'57 In the January 2003 request Mexico asserted
that C6sar Roberto Fierro Reyna could face execution as early as February
14, 2003.158 Factually significant in its allegation of a coerced confession
given in the absence of any notification of consular access rights, 19 Fierro's
latest writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied on March 31,
2003." As of November 2003, Fierro Reyna remains alive, but faces execu-
tion scheduling at any time. 6'
Fierro's case exemplifies the substantive reasons Mexico seeks redress
for consular notification violations of behalf of so many of its nationals. In
1980, a Texas jury convicted Fierro of the 1979 murder of Nicolas Castanon,
an El Paso taxicab driver." Fierro had signed a written confession to the
murder while in police custody. 63 He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
confession before trial, claiming he had signed the statement involuntarily.'"
Fierro alleged that detective Al Medrano told him during his initial interro-
gation that Mexican police just over the border in Ciuidad Juarez had raided
his mother's home and would hold his mother and step-father in jail and tor-
ture them until he confessed to the murder.65 Fierro claimed' Medrano
showed him letters seized from his mother and he confessed in order to re-
lease his parents."
Medrano denied knowledge of these allegations and claimed that Fierro
himself suggested his mother was being detained by Juarez police.167 How-
ever, he stated that he had breakfast with Juarez Police Commandante Jorge
Palacios on the morning of the raid.168 The jury convicted Fierro based on the
written confession to Medrano and the testimony of an alleged eyewitness."6
Fierro's appellate challenges regarding the involuntary nature of his confes-
sion failed before state and federal courts. 7
157. Avena Order, supra note 3, 11, at 4-5.
158. Id. I 11, at 5.
159. Application, supra note 3, 165-167, at 26 (claiming Mexico only learned of Fi-
erro's detention through information provided by his mother); A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4;
see also DPIC, supra note 4.
160. Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674 (5" Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1621.
161. Application, supra note 3, 1 168, at 26.
162. Fierro, 294 F.3d at 677-78.
163. Id. at 677.
164. Id. at 677-78.
165. Id. at 677; A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4.
166. Fierro, 294 F.3d at 677 n.3.
167. Id. at 677 n.5.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 678.
170. Id.; see Fierro v. Texas, 706 S.W. 2d 310, 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Fierro v.
Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub non, Fierro v. Collins, 494 U.S.
1060 (1990).
18
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In 1994, Fierro filed a state habeas petition based on a newly discovered
police report documenting Medrano's 1979 telephone conversation with
Palacios, who "stated that they had raided the house [of Fierro' s parents] this
morning... and had in custody the mother of the suspect... and her com-
mon law husband... ,," Based on this and other evidence contradicting
Medrano's prior trial testimony, the Texas state habeas trial court concluded
the confession was likely coerced and recommended a new trial.'
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted these findings and held
that Fierro's due process rights were violated by the perjured testimony.'
Based on its perceived credibility of the eyewitness testimony, however, a
majority of the court determined that it was more probable than not that the
jury would have found Fierro guilty despite suppression of the coerced con-
fession.7 " Mexico claims that El Paso police knew Fierro was Mexican but
never informed him of his right to contact the consulate.'75 Mexico posits
prompt notification would have led to the consulate's intervention, specifi-
cally that consular officials would have immediately procured the release of
Fierro's parents from their illegal detention. "6 The Mexican government fur-
ther declares that its efforts were crucial in tracking down the new evi-
dence. " '
Excepting the slim chance of clemency, Fierro's fate depends not only
on the success or failure of Avena before the I.C.J., but if and how U.S.
courts or the Executive branch implement the Order and any final judgment
issued before his likely execution.
B. Claims & Judgment Requested by Mexico
In Avena, Mexico claims the U.S. violated its international legal obliga-
tions under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention to both Mexico and to
its arrested nationals by failing to inform Mexico of the nationals' detention
and the nationals of their right to consular contact "without delay." 8 Mexico
asserts this claim on behalf of the 54 Mexicans named in the application, and
171. Fierro, 294 F.3d at 678.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Ex Parte Fierro, 934 S.W. 2d 370, 371-72 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1122 (1997)).
174. Fierro, 294 F.3d at 678-79.
175. Margaret A. Jacobs, Foreigners' Convictions Raise Rights Issue, WALL ST. J., Nov.
4, 1997, at Law, available at http://www.cesarfierro.com/clips.htm ("In Mr. Fierro's case,
Mexican authorities say they could have alleviated the pressure to confess. Francisco Molina
Ruis, the attorney general of the state of Chihuahua, said in court papers in Mr. Fierro's ap-
peal that he would have personally investigated the parents' detention and probably ordered
their release.").
176. A Texas Tragedy, supra note 4.
177. Jacobs, supra note 175.
178. Application, supra note 3, 280(a)-(b), at 43 (citing Convention, supra note 7, art.
36(1)(b)).
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for all Mexican nationals who are being or have been arrested for capital
murder.'79 Mexico characterizes the U.S. violations as ongoing."
Mexico alleges that the U.S.'s violation of its duty to Mexico to ensure
open communication with its arrested nationals under 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention prevented Mexico from exercising its right to fulfill its consular
duties under articles 5 and 36 of the Convention.'8 ' Mexico cites the Vienna
Convention's article 36, paragraph 2, mandate that municipal law give full
effect to the rights embodied in article 36, paragraph 182 Based on 36(2) and
article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Mexico claims
that U.S. municipal law prevents Mexico and its nationals from vindicating
their rights under article 36 and thus the U.S. continues to violate 36(2). '83
Mirroring the judgment requested in past applications by Paraguay and
Germany, Mexico requests that the I.C.J. declare (1) the U.S. has repeatedly
violated the Vienna Convention through "arresting, detaining, trying, con-
victing, and sentencing to death Mexican nationals without advising of their
Article 36 rights"; (2) Mexico is entitled to restitution; (3) the U.S. must not
apply procedural default or other municipal law to bar Article 36 claims; and
(4) the U.S. must comply with the Vienna Convention for any future deten-
tion of the fifty-four Mexicans or any other Mexicans in its territory, by any
power available domestically or internationally.'84 Mexico additionally de-
sires that the I.C.J. declare the right to consular notification under the Vienna
Convention to be a human right.'
Mexico wishes the U.S. be directed to (1) re-establish the pre-Vienna
violation status as to the 54 Mexicans named in Avena; (2) ensure U.S. do-
mestic law gives full effect to the intended purposes of Article 36; (3) pro-
vide a meaningful remedy at law for Vienna Convention violations, includ-
ing removal of a procedural penalty for failure to raise a Vienna Convention
claim at trial; and (4) fully guarantee to Mexico that the Vienna Convention
violations will cease to occur.'86
C. The Avena Order for Provisional Measures
Within a month of Mexico's January 9, 2003 application and accompa-
nying request for a PMO, the I.C.J. issued a PMO.'87 To prevent "irreparable
179. Id. I 280(b), at 43.
180. Id. I 280(a), at 43.
181. Id. I 280(c), at 43-44.
182. Id. I 280(d), at 44. (citing Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(2)).
183. Id. (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679).
184. Id. 281, at 44-45.
185. ld.
186. Id.
187. ld. 284, at 45; Avena Order, supra note 3, 9, at 4, 59, at 15.
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prejudice"'88 and protect its interest in the lives of those among the Avena
subjects '89 who it found were on the verge of consummated execution,'"
Mexico asked the I.C.J. to order the U.S. to "take all measures necessary to
ensure that Mr. Crsar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos,
and Mr. Osvaldo [Netzahualc6yotl] Torres Aguilera are not executed pend-
ing final judgment in these proceedings."' 9 '
D. "But I'm an American! "-Mexican Practice
under the Vienna Convention
This phrase particularly exemplifies the stark practical difference be-
tween the Mexican and the American arrested in the other's country. Upon
arrest, Americans demand to speak to some U.S. representative without any
knowledge of the Vienna Convention and, those that do not make the re-
quest, are routinely informed of their Vienna Convention rights by Mexican
officials.'' The Mexican, however, often does not know nor is informed by
U.S. officials of his or her right to speak with the closest Mexican consu-
late."' A brief look at Mexican practice of providing consular access to U.S.
nationals detained in Mexico gives some perspective as to the disparity of
treatment of Mexican arrestees in the U.S. despite the Vienna Convention's
clear mandate for consular access rights.
More Americans are arrested in Mexico than in any other foreign coun-
try. 9" Specifically, the Mexican states of Baja California Norte and Baja
California Sur (collectively "Baja") claim more arrests of Americans each
year than the balance of the Mexican states combined.'9' Upon arrest in Baja,
Mexican officials routinely notify Americans that they may contact the
American consulate.'96 In addition, Mexican authorities, both state and fed-
188. Avena Order, supra note 3, 28, at 8, 34, at 9, 55, at 14 (referring to the risk of
execution of at least three Mexican nationals before the I.C.J. is able to rule on the merits).
189. Id. 13, at 5 (citing Mexico's asserted "paramount interest in the life and liberty of
its nationals and to ensure the Court's ability to order the relief Mexico seeks"); but see id. at
Declaration of Judge Shigeru Oda (voting in favor of the Order but referencing his "doubts"
as to the propriety of the Order via prior declarations in similar cases; for example in La-
Grand (LaGrand Order, supra note 24, [ 6, countering that "[i]f the request in the present case
had not been granted, the Application itself would have become meaningless... [and] I
would have had no hesitation in pointing out that the request for provisional measures should
not be used to ensure that the main Application continues.")).
190. Id. 55, at 14 (conceding Mexico's assertion that three of its nationals "are at risk
of execution in the coming months, or possibly even weeks").
191. Id. I 59(a), at 15.
192. Interview with Greg Garland, Consular Officer at the United States Consulate in
Tijuana, Baja California Norte, Mexico, in San Diego, California (Mar. 24, 2003) (interview
notes on file with the author) [hereinafter Interview].
193. See Al Report, supra note 29, at 4; see also Application, supra note 3, 1 268-279, at
40-43 (describing the "pattern and practice of violations" by the U.S.).
194. Interview, supra note 192.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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eral, contact the American consulate to notify them of the detention of U.S.
citizens as a matter of course."7
While the logistics of Mexican prisons can present barriers to confiden-
tial communications between Americans and their consuls and/or attorneys,
Americans receive the comfort and fundamental assistance their consulate
can provide practically as a matter of right.'98 Apparently, the American ar-
rested in Mexico receives the benefits of the Convention regardless of any
request or claim on his or her own behalf."
IV. IMPLICATIONS OFAVENA IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A. Differences from Breard & LaGrand
Avena differs in scope from the prior cases before the I.C.J. which
raised U.S. violations of Article 36. Breard and LaGrand concerned just a
few foreign nationals arrested in the U.S. On the other hand, Mexico's action
concerns 54 of its citizens, the entirety of Mexicans currently sentenced to
death across the U.S. The large number of persons concerned may make the
case infinitely more visible to the U.S., Mexico and the international public.
Regarding timing, Paraguay and Germany filed their I.C.J. applications
just days before the scheduled executions of Angel Breard and Walter La-
Grand.2" Indeed, both the I.C.J. and the Supreme Court questioned the pro-
priety of such late filings."' However, many of the Avena subjects remain in
state habeas corpus or other appellate proceedings, likely making any execu-
tion years away."2 Indeed, only three of the 54 Mexicans in question have
197. Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 175 ("In the case of Mexico, where the issue has
been widely covered by the media, the government has 'almost always notified the American
Consulate when a U.S. citizen is arrested in Mexico,' according to Luis Cabrera, who heads
the Mexican consulate in Phoenix.").
198. Interview, supra note 192. Since Mexican officials routinely inform foreign national
arrestees from Vienna Convention signatory countries of their consular rights, it is doubtful
that criminal defendants have had to raise Convention violation claims in Mexican courts. Mr.
Garland has yet to hear of such a case in Mexico. Id.
199. Interestingly, Mr. Garland notes that some U.S. nationals of Mexican descent will
decline to reveal their citizenship to Mexican officials so as to avoid contact with the U.S.
consulate, often due to prior criminal records in the United States. Eventually, however,
Mexican officials often discover their citizenship and will notify the American consulate of
their detention. Id.
200. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 374; F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 111.
201. See LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, 49-63; see also F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 112
(noting that Germany's March 2, 1999 motions were "filed within only two hours of a sched-
uled execution.., about which the Federal Republic of Germany learned in 1992. Given the
tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers [of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment] we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction").
202. But see Avena Order, supra note 3, 55, at 14 (conceding Mexico's assertion that
three of its nationals "are at risk of execution in the coming months, or possibly even
weeks"); see also id. I 11, at 4-5 (claiming that all Avena subjects potentially face execution
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2003], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol34/iss1/6
2003] THE FUTURE OF CONSULAR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 137
exhausted their state and federal appellate options and await state execution
scheduling, for which Mexico has asked and received the I.C.J. Order to the
U.S. to act to stay the executions."3
Avena follows LaGrand in one aspect of the relief sought. Mexico prays
that the I.C.J. equate and declare "consular notification under the Vienna
Convention is a human right."" The I.C.J. refused to recognize a human
right in LaGrand, holding instead that Article 36 should be construed as cre-
ating individual rights. 5 If the I.C.J had proclaimed a human right, such a
declaration might give human rights organizations the standing they cur-
rently lack to enforce the Vienna Convention rights in U.S. courts. However,
it probably would not aid an individual defendant's success in U.S. courts.
The benefits of such a decision likely lie in increasing political pressure on
the U.S. to ensure compliance with Vienna over time.
In further contrast, Mexico, via its request in Avena, attempts to extend
the limits of the I.C.J.'s power. Mexico asks the Court to bar "the imposi-
tion, as a matter of municipal law, of any procedural penalty for the failure
timely to raise a claim or defense based on the Vienna Convention where
competent authorities of the United States have breached their obligation to
advise the national of his or her rights under the Convention."2" This request
refers specifically to the U.S. domestic doctrine of procedural default that
now bars almost all of the Avena subjects' Vienna Convention claims.2"
Whether the I.C.J. removes the procedural bar raises the question of its
power under international law to reorder the U.S. criminal justice system.
In LaGrand, the I.C.J found that procedural default did not violate the
Vienna Convention except as applied to bar Walter's claim. The I.C.J. left
the means to the U.S. to circumvent the procedural bar. The U.S., in Avena,
claims to have provided the means through its system of clemency." 8 Mex-
ico now asks the I.C.J. to directly eliminate procedural default as a bar to
Vienna claims."° The Court will likely not make such a declaration to avoid
threatening U.S. sovereign integrity and to prevent becoming a "court of ap-
peal of national criminal proceedings.""21
before the end of 2003, providing the basis for the application because of the risk of irrepara-
ble harm).
203. Avena Order, supra note 3, 31, at 8.
204. Id. 8, at 3-4; Application, supra note 3, 281, at 44.
205. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, U 65-78.
206. Application, supra note 3, 281, at 44-45.
207. Id. 117-127.
208. Avena Order, supra note 3, 44, at 11.
209. Application, supra note 3, 281, at 44.
210. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, U 49-63.
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B. The Avena Provisional Order & Future Judgment
after Breard & LaGrand
Mexico appears to have learned from the mistakes made by Paraguay
and Germany. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Breard and LaGrand, attacked
the "tardiness" '' and "eleventh hour"2"' nature of the sovereign seeking relief
and of the I.C.J.'s hurried issuance of the PMOs in those cases."3 The I.C.J.
itself also questioned the propriety of Germany's mere application in its La-
Grand judgment."
However, Avena eliminates this judicial concern for punctuality be-
cause, while three of the Mexican nationals have exhausted their appellate
options and face death at any time, no executions have been scheduled as of
the time of this publication. As mentioned above, the large majority of
Avena subjects remain in the purgatory of trial and direct and collateral ap-
peals, making it likely that any executions will occur in the distant future.
In the LaGrand Supreme Court decision, Justice Breyer's dissent em-
phasized that the majority's judgment rested on summary conclusions which,
in his view, "suggest a need for fuller briefing." ' Avena's relatively early
filing implies that the Supreme Court ruling would be augmented by the op-
portunity for further review for proper adjudication, with potentially the
guidance of an I.C.J. judgment in hand.
The current Order tells the U.S. to restrain Texas and Oklahoma from
scheduling the executions of three Mexicans who have exhausted their ap-
peals. 6 In response to the Order, Texas, through a gubernatorial spokesman,
declared "there is no authority for the federal government or this World
Court to prohibit Texas from exercising the laws passed by our legisla-
ture.21
1 7
Arguably, LaGrand's holding regarding the force of PMOs leaves no
question as to the U.S.'s duty to make all efforts to comply with the I.C.J.'s
211. See F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 112; see also Breard, 523 U.S. at 378 ("It is unfortunate that
this matter came before us while proceedings are pending before the I.C.J. that might have
been brought to that court earlier.").
212. See F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 112, 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 111.
214. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 24, 1% 49-63; see Breard, 523 U.S. at 378 ("It is un-
fortunate that this matter came before us while proceedings are pending before the I.C.J. that
might have been brought to that court earlier," implying that had Paraguay acted earlier to
facilitate issuance of an I.C.J. judgment, the Supreme Court would not then have had to rule
on Paraguay's petitions during concurrent international litigation); cf. Avena Order, supra
note 3, 54, at 14-15 (noting the Supreme Court's lament that Paraguay had not filed their
application with the I.C.J. sooner).
215. F.R.G., 526 U.S. at 114 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216. Avena Order, supra note 3, 59(a), at 15.
217. C. Bryson Hull, Texas Snubs World Court on Execution Stays, REUTERS, Feb. 6,
2003, at http://www.cjcj.org/press/texas-snubs.html (last visited June 24, 2003).
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Avena Order."' The Texas Executive branch correctly states that the World
Court cannot directly interfere with the exercise of its internal law. However,
the federal foreign affairs power"9 in combination with the LaGrand judg-
ment should give the federal government the political power to compel
Texas, Oklahoma, or any other state to temporarily halt execution schedul-
ing.
In the LaGrand Order, the I.C.J. mandated that the U.S. "should take all
measures" to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand prior to an I.C.J.
judgment."' In a small but significant change from the LaGrand Order, the
I.C.J. said in the Avena Order that the U.S. "shall take all measures" to delay
any executions of the 54 Mexicans who experienced violations of the Vienna
Convention."' What remains in question is the scope of "all measures"
available (or amenable) to the U.S. to take to direct the individual states to
usurp their convictions. LaGrand now provides clear guidance to the Su-
preme Court as to the positive effect of PMOs, which will now truly be
tested by the Avena Order. At a minimum, the LaGrand ruling refutes the
Supreme Court's assertion of the last-in-time doctrine in Breard that blocked
Breard's claim under the Vienna Convention, via AEDPA, and prevented
him from bringing a habeas petition that could have spared his life. Thus,
LaGrand should give additional persuasiveness to the existing Avena Order,
and any new habeas petitions filed by the Avena subjects citing these in-
struments.
Further, LaGrand provides, while leaving the manner of implementation
to the United States, the framework to create a remedy for violations, which
the Vienna Convention itself appears to lack. With regard to Avena, the U.S.
claims that its system of clemency satisfies the I.C.J.'s mandate in LaGrand
for "review and reconsideration" of convictions adjudged in violation of the
Vienna Convention.2 Mexico derides the suggestion that "the standardless,
218. Several authors predict what minimum efforts must now be taken by the U.S. to
comply with any future I.C.J. provisional measures orders in light of the LaGrand judgment.
See, e.g., Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision: The Evolving Legal Landscape of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1099, 1125-27 (2002) (arguing that at a minimum, compliance with future orders would
demand that the federal executive branch unequivocally support a stay of execution and
communicate this support to state and judicial officials); see also Vasquez, supra note 93, at
689, 691 (arguing in a pre-LaGrand article in reference to Breard that "our Constitution does
not leave the decision whether to comply with ICJ orders, be they technically 'binding' or not,
to state Governors," and that an executive order to stay Breard's execution could fairly have
been given considering "the President's authority to execute treaties, combined with his for-
eign affairs power" and the executive branch's expedience).
219. See generally Vasquez, supra note 93, at 688-89.
220. LaGrand Order, supra note 24, 1 29. see William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations: Recent Developments, 2003 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES REPORT
(Paul L. Hoffman, ed., 2003), at http:sdshh.com/ICLR/ICLR_2003/9_Aceves.pdf (based on
essay that will appear in 97 A.J.I.L. (forthcoming 2003)).
221. Avena Order, supra note 3, 1 59(a) (emphasis added); Aceves, supra note 220.
222. Avena Order, supra note 3, 1 44.
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secretive and unreviewable process that is called clemency" fulfills the
I.C.J.'s direction in LaGrand.223 This suggests the possibility that an Avena
judgment may pick up where LaGrand left off by at least indicating that ex-
ecutive clemency fails to provide sufficient "review and reconsideration" in
these cases. While the I.C.J. would likely continue to leave the manner to the
U.S., this baseline and any suggestions from the court as to what procedures
would be sufficient will be highly significant by guiding the Avena subjects
and their counsel with a substantive method to seek relief. As relief for
violations remains out of reach, specific methods of relief suggested by the
I.C.J. to the U.S. run to the core of the dispute for Mexicans as well as any
other nationals who will endure Vienna Convention violations in the future.
A viable path to relief should be offered by the I.C.J. Moreover, a clear
statement that the holdings of LaGrand apply to all nationals may well be
necessary to effectuate the standards of the Vienna Convention in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
Mexico's Avena case must be construed as a necessary evil because
"[tihese cases strain U.S. relations with normally friendly countries.""2 " U.S.
and Mexican affairs are intertwined to the extent that further exacerbation of
the problem could deadlock trade, immigration and other joint U.S.-Mexico
projects. As shown by Mexico's President Vicente Fox's cancellation in
2002 of a meeting with President Bush because of the execution of a Mexi-
can national who had been denied consular notification,22 the tensions are
real. However, U.S. federalist principles continue to present legal hurdles to
direct implementation of LaGrand or a future I.C.J. ruling in Avena.
Thankfully, LaGrand and a future Avena ruling are not necessarily in-
compatible with U.S. domestic law. 6 The I.C.J.'s mandate to provide re-
view and reconsideration in cases involving Vienna violations is just and can
be implemented as an available habeas claim. When state and federal justice
departments tire of these claims they are uniquely positioned to resolve field
policies so that foreign defendants receive consular notification as a matter
of course.
From a non-legal perspective, education and discussion among the de-
fense bar and prosecutors and a clear policy statement from the State De-
partment must occur. Defense attorneys, by notifying defendants to contact
223. Avena Order, supra note 3, 45, at 12.
224. Schiffman, supra note 218, at 1134.
225. Mexico's President Snubs Bush, supra note 65.
226. See Weinman, supra note 105, at 884-903; see generally Daniel J. Lehman, The
Federal Republic of Germany v. The United States of America: The Individual Right to Con-
sular Access, 20 LAW & INEQ. 313, 327-338 (2002) (suggesting that the defense bar must
raise Vienna claims at trial, making the determination of prejudice and subsequent suppres-
sion or other relief more common).
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their consulate, may eliminate a future claim of consular access denial, but in
the process may gain exculpatory evidence in a timely fashion. Moreover,
prosecutors who encourage foreign defendants to interact with their consu-
late satisfy ethical obligations to ensure that all available evidence is pro-
vided to a jury, which can only increase their credibility. Ideally, the magni-
tude of the Avena case and the value of Mexican relations should spur the
State Department to make further efforts to convince justice departments to
comply with the requirements of the Vienna Convention, regardless of any
eventual judgment in the case.
In addition, Mexico must continue to make efforts to educate its popu-
lace as to their rights. Some possibilities include media campaigns and in-
formation at the border, for if Mexican citizens and their families know their
rights, the problem can be solved at the source.
Notwithstanding educational measures by Mexico, the U.S. must re-
member the value of friendly foreign relations, especially at a time when in-
ternational cooperation is integral to combating terrorism, the drug trade, and
the spread of new diseases in our rapidly-globalizing world. The existence of
Avena reveals Mexico's recognition that diplomatic solutions with the U.S.
have failed. In 2001, President Fox remarked, "[flor us in Mexico, today we
know that we have friends, that we have a partner, and that we have a better
future for us and for our people."27 Regardless of the outcome of Avena at
the I.C.J., President Fox's pronouncement rings hollow unless the U.S.
"take[s] all measures at its disposal," '28 whether judicially or politically, to
comply with the fundamental spirit of the Vienna Convention and respect
the citizenry of its Mexican partner.
227. Mexican President Vincente Fox, Remarks to University of Toledo Faculty, Stu-
dents and Community at University of Toledo's Savage Hall (Sep. 6, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010906-11.html (referring to the
United States in a joint speech with President George W. Bush at which both officials em-
phatically proclaimed mutual U.S.-Mexico friendship of broad scope).
228. See Breard Order, supra note 24, 1 41(1); LaGrand Order, supra note 24, 1 29()(a).
See also Avena Order, supra note 3, 1 59(I)(a), at 15.
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POST-SCRIPT: "CAN THE ISLAND OF TOBAGO PASS A LAW TO BIND THE
RIGHTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD?"'2 29
November 17, 2003 marked the first decision issued by the Supreme
Court concerning a petition of one of the Mexican citizens named in the
Avena case, since the I.C.J.'s issuance of a provisional measures order in that
case.23 The Supreme Court denied Osbaldo Torres' petition without com-
ment except for the dissents by Justices John Paul Steven and Stephen
Breyer. 3' Justice Stevens concluded that, in light of the I.C.J.'s "authorita-
tive interpretation of Article 36 in the LaGrand Case," his dissent in Breard
v. Greene should have been directed at the merits of that court's holding and
not at the procedural grounds.232
Both Stevens and Breyer relied on the supremacy clause to establish
that treaties are the law of the land, " and thus the U.S.'s ratification of the
Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settle-
ment of Disputes submits the U.S. to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. on disputes
arising from the Vienna Convention."
Breyer listed Torres' and Mexico's arguments, which included: (1) the
supremacy clause and the self-executing nature of the Vienna Convention
making it binding law; (2) the Vienna Convention's establishment of indi-
vidual rights per LaGrand and its holding that U.S. law "must enable full ef-
fect to be given" to the treaty; (3) that procedural default violates the treaty;
(4) that whether or not an individual would have requested consular assis-
229. See Torres v. Mullin, No. 03-5781, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8548, at *14 (S. Ct. Nov. 17,
2003) (citing Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808)).
230. Id. at *1. Some facts in Tones' case can be found in Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d
1145 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, No. 03-5781, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8548 (S. Ct. Nov. 17,
2003). For example, the prosecution's evidence showed that Torres and his co-defendant
parked near the home where the murders took place, took a gun from the trunk of their car,
broke down the front door of a home and shot the two resident victims. Id. at 1149. They were
later arrested a few blocks away. Id. The sole eyewitness to the killings was one of the vic-
tim's eleven year-old son who saw the co-defendant shoot his father. Id. The first trial re-
sulted in a hung jury and mistrial, followed by a second trial convicting Tores and the co-
defendant of murder and burglary. Id. Two judges out of a three-judge panel of the Tenth Cir-
cuit denied Torres' habeas claims based on: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to show intent
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for malice murder or burglary; (2) improper jury instruc-
tions; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) destruction of evidence; (5) and the Eighth Amend-
ment. See id. Judge Henry based his dissent on grounds that the jury instructions failed to re-
quire the jury to find intent for aiding and abetting a malicious murder. Id. at 1162, 1164-
1168. Henry also found an insufficient record to support a murder conviction, but that the
deferential standard of review precluded turning over the conviction on that basis. Id. at 1162.
Based on the failure of the jury instructions to properly instruct on the intent element for mal-
ice murder, Judge Henry would grant the writ, vacate the murder convictions, and order a new
trial. Id. at 1162, 1168.
231. See id.
232. Torres, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8548, at *1-2.
233. Id. at *4-5 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.)
234. Id. at*li.
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tance is immaterial; and (5) that the Avena I.C.J. Order issued to specifically
prevent Torres' execution pending conclusion of Avena binds the U.S. after
LaGrand.23 5 Breyer found these arguments substantial, in that they raise the
question before the Supreme Court as to whether the I.C.J. has been given
the power by treaty to interpret the Vienna Convention in the way that it is.
236
Because the answer "may well be yes," Breyer believes that a decision on
Torres' petition should await the Avena decision and further briefing.237 Be-
cause the Court's denial removes any federal barrier to Oklahoma's pending
execution,238 Osbaldo Torres may not live to see the answer.
Alan Macina"
235. Id. at *8-13 (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128 (Feb. 5 )).
236. Id. at*13-14.
237. See id. at *14.
238. See id. at *13 ("Oklahoma might set an execution date within 60 days of our deny-
ing certiorari").
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